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Abstract: The current research is an attempt to offer new insights into the 
association between hiring high-quality audit firms and corporate debt 
maturity structure.  To this end, 94 firms listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange were scrutinized for the period 2011-2015. To test the research 
hypotheses, multiple regression and data panel were employed. The findings 
confirm that a high-quality audit firm can enhance the debt maturity. The 
results of testing the research hypothesis point to a significant correlation 
between the hiring of a high-quality audit firm and corporate debt maturity 
structure, in that short-term debt and quality audit are two alternative 
mechanisms used to mitigate information asymmetry and monitor managerial 
behavior. Therefore, in firms audited by high-quality audit firms, due to the 
effective monitoring imposed by auditors on debt convent, creditors experience 
information asymmetry and less agency costs, thereby desiring to extend the 
debt maturity. The findings of current study not only fill existing gaps in the 
field, but also contribute to decision-making practices in stock exchange. 
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Literature review 
 
New corporate theories are premised on the assumption that the separation of 
ownership and management causes serious conflicts of interest, which, in turn, result 
in agency problem, which can be traced to the information asymmetry between 
managers and owners (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Asymmetric information is 
characterized as the information provided to two or more individuals. In the capital 
market, information asymmetry typically takes place when some insiders (often 
managers), in comparison to some outsiders (investors), have access to privileged 
information about the current condition and future outlook of the business. The 
presence of information asymmetry in the marketplace may bring about adverse 
individual and collective consequences like minimum participation of the investors, 
high transaction costs and liquid markets (Bathacharia et al, 2008). The 
overwhelming amount of theoretical literature seems to suggest that short debt can 
trigger a reduction in information asymmetry and agency costs between managers 
and creditors. Flannery (1986) stated that firms with profitable projects prefer debts 
with short-term maturity to reduce information asymmetry.  
In the presence of information asymmetry, creditors are inclined to believe that 
adopting short debt will ensure effective monitoring of the firm, rather than long 
debt. Furthermore, short-term maturity of debts facilitates better controlling of 
managerial performance by persuading managers to negotiate with creditors. Under 
such circumstances, creditors frequently meet managers, track the firm performance 
during the early periods of debt covenant, and thus deciding whether to extend their 
covenant or change its conditions. Therefore, short debt is expected to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs between managers and creditors (Ghoul et 
al, 2014). On the other hand, a need to resolve the agency problem together with the 
rise of information symmetry sheds light on the importance of the monitoring role 
of an external auditor in improving the information about financial conditions, 
performance and flexibility of a firm, and reducing information asymmetry. That is 
because external auditors promote transparency and accuracy in the financial 
disclosures made by a firm. Information risk and creditors’ uncertainty will diminish 
as information quality increases, resulting in a decrease in the information 
asymmetry of the market (Francis et al, 2004). Hence, on these grounds, the research 
has provided ample support for the assertion that short-term debt maturity and 
quality audit play pivotal roles in controlling managerial opportunistic behavior and 
reducing information asymmetry. As a result of such strict controls, creditors 
confront with less information asymmetry and agency costs in the firms audited by 
high-quality audit firms and thus desire to extend their debt maturity. Nevertheless, 
most of the Iranian accounting research has ignored such an important issue. 
Therefore, the present research sets out to figure out whether hiring a high-quality 
audit firm is significantly related to corporate debt maturity structure or not? If so, 
how? 
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Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
 
The term structure of corporate debt, which has already attracted considerable 
attention among economists and financial experts, points up the disciplinary role of 
debt in restraining the opportunistic behavior of managers. Recent global financial 
crises have underlined the importance of term structure of the corporate resource in 
financial stability (Ball et al, 2009). 
Current research appears to validate the view that the maturity of corporate resource 
seems to provoke future global crises. Most companies use debt in their capital 
structure. Debt structure is considered as one of the most important indicators of 
firm success, which stimulates corporate sustainable growth. Therefore, decisions 
made on debt structure is of paramount significance to the business survival of 
company (Ghoul et al, 2014). Greater debts prevent managers from making value-
reducing decisions for company. Additionally, Jensen (1986) propounds the view 
that constant payment of debts will attenuate corporate free cash flow, thereby 
preventing managers from wasting firm resources to their own interests. On the 
other hand, creditors prefer short debt to long debt due to more opportunities they 
have for monitoring their company, and they recommend such debts to their firms 
in the presence of information asymmetry and agency costs. This is because short 
debt impedes managers’ efforts to undertake ambitious and risky projects (Ghoul et 
al, 2014). The importance of short-term debt and high-quality audit in lowering the 
information asymmetry and monitoring the purposes has assisted creditors to 
experience less information asymmetry and agency costs in firms audited by 4 big 
audit firms due to the effective control over debt covenant by auditors, and thus 
desiring to extend the debt maturity. Given this argument, Chung et al (2009) put 
forward the view that firms audited by 4 big audit firms employ debt with longer 
maturity in their financial decisions. Similarly, Ghoul et al (2014) also presented 
evidence confirming a significant relationship between high-quality auditor choice 
and debt maturity structure. On this logical arguments, the research hypothesis is 
developed as follows: 
 
Research hypothesis: Hiring a high-quality audit firm is significantly associated with debt maturity 
structure. 
 
 
 
 
Review of Literature 
 
Huag et al (2016) in a study entitled “CEO overconfidence and corporate debt 
maturity” sampled 4309 firm-year observations during the years 2006-2012 and then 
examined the impact of CEO overconfidence on debt maturity structure. Their 
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findings lent support to the claim that overconfident CEOs make use of short-term 
debts to finance their firm. Deramadi (2016) investigated the relationship between 
family ownership and ownership concentration with audit choice for a sample of 
787 firm-year in the firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The results of 
their study demonstrated that increasing ownership concentration may increase the 
likelihood of choosing a big audit firm. Having studied the correlation between 
hiring a high-quality audit firm and debt maturity structure for a sample of 42679 
firm-year in 42 firms throughout the world, Ghoul et al (2014) concluded that firms 
audited by big (high-quality) audit firms enjoy long-term debt. Kirch et al (2012) 
addressed the issue of the factors affecting South-American corporate debt maturity 
structure and reported that variables like firm size, business risk and fixed tangible 
asset ratio exert significant influence on corporate debt maturity structure. Ge et al 
(2012) examined the effect of corporate governance on corporate debt maturity 
structure on a sample of firms from 22 countries during the years 2003-2007 and 
discovered that firms with stronger corporate governance experience long-term 
debt. In an article named “The effect of auditor choice on financing decisions”, 
Chung et al (2009) employed firm size as a measure of audit quality and examined 
the effect of hiring a high-quality audit firm on Chinese corporate debt maturity 
structure. They documented that firms audited by high-quality audit firms use long-
term debt in their financing decisions. 
 
Goodarzi and Babazadeshirvan (2015) provided confirmatory evidence for the 
positive and significant association between the quality of financial statements and 
debt maturity, and investment efficacy. Rahimian and Tiregari (2013) studied the 
effect of modified audit opinion on the debt maturity structure of 102 firms listed on 
the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2006-2011. Their findings nullified the 
effect of modified audit opinion on corporate debt maturity structure.  
 
Methodology 
As an applied, quasi-experimental and ex post facto research, this study is conducted 
in the domain of positive accounting using multivariate regression method and 
econometric models. The statistical population is composed of all firms listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2011-2015, among which 94 firms meeting 
the following conditions were selected: 
1- They have been listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2015. 
2- To increase comparability, their fiscal years end March 31. 
3- They have been engaged in the same business during the proposed fiscal year. 
4- They are not classified as investment companies or financial intermediaries. 
 
Data Analysis 
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In this research, there is one dependent variable, one independent variable, and four 
control variables that are used to test the research hypotheses. 
 
 
Dependent variable 
The corporate debt maturity structure serves as the dependent variable in the 
research model, which, following Ghoul et al (2014) and Chang et al (2009), is 
calculated using long-term debt-to-total debt ratio. 
 
Independent variable 
The independent variable used to test the research hypothesis is hiring a high-quality 
audit firm. To do so, audit firms were divided into two groups, namely big and small 
firms. Audit organization and Private audit firms affiliated with Society of CPAs 
were selected as big and small audit firms, respectively. Accordingly, if the auditor is 
the audit organization, it is a big and high-quality audit firm and thus valued 1, 
otherwise 0. Theoretically speaking, previous literature has confirmed that audit firm 
size is directly associated with audit quality since big audit firms have experienced 
auditors and better monitoring system, and refused to lose their reputation due to 
low-quality audit. Hence, the bigger the audit firm is, the higher the quality of the 
information of the audited firm is. Many other attempts like those made by 
Banimahd (2012), Namazi et al (2011) and Saghafi and Motamedifazel (2011) have 
employed this method to conduct their research.  
 
Control variables 
The present study considers the following control variables as the most important 
variables affecting debt maturity structure: 
• Firm size: Following Johnson (2003), Bilt et al (2007) and Ghoul et al 
(2014), firm size is calculated through natural logarithm of firm’s net sales. 
• Financial leverage: Similar to Ghoul et al (2014) and Chang et al (2009), 
financial leverage is computed by dividing total debt by total assets. 
• Profitability: following Ge et al (2012) and Chang et al (2009), return on 
owner’s equity is used to calculate the corporate profitability. 
• Firm growth: Similar to Ghoul et al 92014), firm growth is computed with 
respect to annual sales change. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the measurement of variables used in this paper. 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
MATURITY long-term debt-to-total debt ratio. 
Independent variable 
AUD if the auditor is the audit organization, it is a big and high-quality audit firm 
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To test the research hypothesis, the model proposed by Ghoul et al (2014) was 
adopted and then modified based on the Iranian context. The model is as follows: 
MATURITY_it=β_0+β_1 AUD_it+β_2 Size_it+β_3 Lev_it+β_4 ROE_it+β_5 
GWTH_it+ε_it (1) 
Where: 
MATURITY_it: is debt maturity structure of firm i in year t.  
AUD_it: hiring a high-quality auditor for firm i in year t. 
Size_it: the size of firm I in year t. 
Lev_it: financial leverage of firm i in year t.  
ROE_it: net income-to-market value of equity for firm i in year t.  
GWTH_it: annual salegrowth rate for firm i in year t. 
Since the panel data are superior to time-series, cross-sectional models with respect 
to the number of observations, low probability of collinearity among variables, bias 
reduction in estimation and heterogeneity of variance (Gujarati, 2009), the 
multivariate regression model based on panel data was employed to test the research 
hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Results/Findings 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the research variables for a sample of 
470 firm-year during the years 2011-2015. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
MATURITY 470 0.185 0.161 0.071 0.644 0.139 
AUD 470 0.383 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.466 
and thus valued 1, otherwise 0 
Control Variables 
SIZE Firm size measured as natural logarithm of firm’s net sales. 
LEV Leverage measured as the total debts divided by total assets. 
ROE Profitability measured through dividing net income by market value of the 
corporate equity. 
GWTH Firm growth measured as the annual sales change. 
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SIZE 470 12.023 11.934 9.912 14.563 0.746 
LEV 470 0.618 0.605 0.091 1.714 0.238 
ROE 470 0.131 0.128 -1.820 3.754 0.308 
GWTH 470 0.211 0.189 -0.436 2.041 0.681 
 
As can be seen, the audit organization has audited about 38% of the sampled firms 
on average. The mean and median for the variable of firm size were obtained 12.023 
and 11.934, respectively, for which the minimum and maximum values are 9.912 and 
14.563, respectively. Likewise, about 62% of the assets of the sampled firms used 
debt to finance their assets. The net income calculated for the sampled firms equals 
to 13% of the market value of the firm’s equity.    
 
The results of testing the research hypothesis 
Regarding the panel data analysis, F- limer needs to be tested to distinguish the usage 
of pool or panel data method, and Hausman test was also used to determine the 
fixed effect or random method usage. Additionally, Jarque-Bera test is performed to 
examine whether residuals show normal distribution or not, and to identify 
heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test and 
Wooldridge test were employed, respectively. The results of the tests are represented 
in table 3. 
Table 3: The results of Tests Used for The Research Model 
Test Statistics Result 
F-limer test 9.018** The efficacy of panel data 
Hausman Test 17.844* The efficacy of fixed effects method 
Jarque-Bera test 2.215 Normality of residuals 
LR test 375.06** Heteroscedasticity 
Wooldrige test 2.139 Lack of autocorrelation 
Notes: ** and * denote significance at the  0.01 and  0.05  levels, respectively . 
 
As can be seen, F-limer test and its level of significance suggests the use of panel 
data method. The results of Hausman test and its level of significance indicate that 
the model has to be estimated using fixed effects method. Since the significance level 
of Jarque-Bera test is greater than 0.05, the normal distribution of residuals is 
confirmed. The results of LR test reveal that the research model suffers from 
heteroscedasticity, which can be removed by estimating the model using Generalized 
Least Square method. The level of significance for Wooldridge test points to the lack 
of serial autocorrelation in the model. In addition, to ensure the lack of 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables, the multicollinearity was assessed 
using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). As indicated in Table 4, the values of this 
statistics for the explanatory variables are less than 10, thereby confirming the lack 
of multicollinearity. The results of testing the research hypothesis are presented in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4: Results of Testing Research Hypotheses 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   VIF 
C 1.633 0.454 3.591 0.000 - 
AUD 0.085 0.027 3.055 0.002 1.181 
SIZE 0.084 0.060 1.391 0.165 1.214 
LEV -0.099 0.038 -2.588 0.010 1.163 
ROE 0.067 0.025 2.655 0.008 1.233 
GWTH 0.068 0.051 1.309 0.191 1.218 
F-statistic (prob) 13.850 (0.000)     Durbin-Watson stat 1.930 
R2 0.640              Adjusted R2 0.619 
 
Considering F-statistics and level of significance, one can come to the conclusion 
that the fitted regression model is significant at 95% level. Given the value of 
adjusted R2, the researchers reached the conclusion that independent and control 
variables explain about 62% of changes incorporate debt maturity structure. As 
indicated in the above table, the estimated coefficient and t-statistics of the variable 
of AUD are positive and significant at 0.05 levels, thereby confirming the existence a 
positive and significant relationship between hiring a high-quality audit firm and debt 
maturity structure of the sampled firms. Therefore, the research hypothesis is 
accepted at 0.05 level. Previous research carried out by El-Ghoul et al (2014), 
Pittman & Fortin (2004), Stohs & Mauer (1996) and Sweeney (1994) concurred with 
the findings of this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study is primarily concerned with investigating the relationship between hiring a 
high-quality auditor and corporate debt maturity structure. To do so, a sample of 94 
firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2011-2015 was selected. The 
results of testing the research hypothesis indicated that hiring a high-quality audit 
firm is significantly correlated with corporate debt maturity structure, i.e. short-term 
debt and quality audit are two alternative mechanisms to reduce information 
asymmetry and monitor managerial behavior. Therefore, in firms audited by quality 
audit firms, owing to the effective monitoring imposed by auditors on debt convent, 
creditors experience information asymmetry and less agency costs, thereby desiring 
to extend the debt maturity. Indeed, audit quality by larger-scale audit firms show 
that corporate accounts and liabilities are more orderly, and this can increase the 
transparency of corporate financial statements and reduce the asymmetry of 
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information between Shareholders and corporations. The findings of the current 
research corroborate those reported by Chang et al (2009) and Ghoul et al (2014). 
According to the results, investors and market activists are recommended to 
consider the audit firm as an important factor influencing the corporate debt 
maturity structure. Moreover, general assembly of shareholders and CEOs are also 
suggested to choose big audit firms to promote their audit quality and achieve debt 
with long-term maturity. 
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